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INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL PRACTICE AND THE
WRITTEN FORM REQUIREMENT FOR
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Written and translated by Jing Wangt
I. INTRODUCTION
The requirement that international commercial arbitration agreements
must be made in writing is well accepted in most countries and has become a
uniform practice in international commercial arbitration law. This is due in
large part to the widespread acceptance of the Convention on Recognition
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards ("New York Convention").1
Article II (1) provides that "each Contracting State shall recognize. an
agreement in writing." The term "agreement in writing" is defined in Article
11 (2) of the Convention as "an arbitral clause in a contract or an arbitration
agreement, signed by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or
telegrams." Since the New York Convention took effect, the legislatures of
most jurisdictions have accepted the written form requirement, thereby
excluding the validity of arbitration agreements made tacitly or orally.
Generally, the international practitioners have followed suit, however, some
reject the necessity of the written form requirement.
II. THE WRITTEN FORM REQUIREMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL
ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
The 1958 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
Arbitral Awards requires a valid arbitral agreement to include an arbitral
clause in a contract or an independent arbitration agreement, signed by the
parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. When the parties
sign an agreement containing arbitral clauses, the written form requirement
I This Article was first published in 1999 Supplement to HE BEI FAXUE [HE BEI LAW SCIENCE], one
of the most prestigious law journals in China. See Jing Wang, Ping Guoji Sifa Shijian Dui Guoji
Shangshizhongcai Xieyi Xingshi De Wudu [On International Judicial Practice and the Written Form
Requirement for International Arbitration Agreements], HE BEI FAXUE [HE BE L. SCIENCE], Supp. 1999, at
206-08. This Article has been translated and reprinted with the permission of HE BEI FAXUE [HE BEI LAW
SCIENCE].
1 Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, reprinted in 7 I.L.M. 1042 (1968) (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.)
[hereinafter New York Convention] (this footnote did not appear in the original article).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
is satisfied, thus alleviating the problems associated with oral or tacit arbitral
agreements. When an agreement is made through exchange of letters or
telegrams, the proposal and acceptance of arbitration are the basic elements
of arbitration agreements. However, the exchange of letters or telegrams
must also clarify that proposal and acceptance of an arbitral agreement has
the effect of proving its existence.
The New York Convention differs from the Model Law of the United
Nations International Trade Law Committee. The Model Law states:
The arbitration agreement shall be in writing. An agreement is
in writing if it is contained in a document signed by the parties
or in an exchange of letters, telex, telegrams or other means of
telecommunications which provide a record of the agreement,
or in an exchange of statements of claim and defense.
However, as the Model Law precludes the application of other domestic
laws, its written form requirement is in fact stricter than that of the New
York Convention.
III. MISREADING OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
A. Misinterpretation ofArticle I (2) of the New York Convention
Misinterpretation of Article 11 (2) of the NYC occurs most often in
American courts. The most frequently cited case is Sphere Drake Insurance,
PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc.2 Sphere Drake is about a marine insurance
policy that included a clause for arbitration in London. The insurer was
English and the insured was American. The insured vessel sank after the
broker procured the policy, but before it was delivered to the insured. When
the insured sued for coverage under the policy in a U.S. state court, the
insurer removed the case to federal court, and then moved to stay and to
compel arbitration. The district court found in favor of the English insurer.
The insured appealed, claiming that he had never signed any insurance
contract and there was no "agreement in writing" within the meaning of the
New York Convention. The insured's argument was based on the usual
meaning of the language used in the New York Convention, but was rejected
by the Fifth Circuit. The court ruled that the phrase "signed by the parties or
contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams" modified only the second
2 Sphere Drake Ins., PLC v. Marine Towing, Inc., 16 F.3d 666 (5th Cir. 1994).
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part of the "agreement in writing" definition. Thus, the court held that an
"agreement in writing" included either: (1) an arbitral clause in a contract, or
(2) an arbitration agreement signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams.
This conclusion was made without discussing the text or purpose of
the Convention, and without any discussion of other Article II (2) cases,
most notably Sen Marc Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., where the court held
that an arbitration term was not enforceable under the Convention because it
was not in signed writing nor found in an exchange of letters.
3
After Sphere Drake, other courts construed Article 11 (2) similarly.
For example, in Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd. , Kahn Lucas, a
New York company, issued two purchase orders for finished garments to
Lark International, a Hong Kong corporation that acts as an agent in Asia for
U.S. clothing buyers. Both purchase orders contained arbitration clauses
that read, "any controversy arising out of or relating to this order ... shall be
resolved by arbitration in the city of New York . . ." and "[t]he validity of
this order and construction of the provisions hereof shall be determined in
accordance with the laws of the State of New York." Lark International sub-
contracted production of the goods, arranged for shipment to the United
States, and inspected the goods prior to shipment. After the transaction was
completed, Kahn Lucas claimed that some of the garments had defective
coloring and sued for breach of contract.
The court declined jurisdiction for the breach of contract suit, but held
that it had the power to grant the plaintiffs motion to compel arbitration.
Although Lark International did not dispute that it (1) received the purchase
orders, (2) it failed to object to them, (3) it fulfilled the orders, or (4) that
Kahn Lucas paid for the orders, Lark International nevertheless argued that
there was no arbitration agreement because it never signed or replied to the
orders. The court cited Sphere Drake in its decision, holding that "an
arbitral clause in a contract is sufficient to implicate the Convention. That
is, an 'agreement in writing' does not necessarily have to be either signed by
the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams, as long as the
Court is otherwise able to find 'an arbitral clause in a contract."' Although
the case was reversed on appeal,5 the opinion reflected the desire of some
courts to interpret the Convention freely.
3 Sen Marc Inc. v. Tiger Petroleum Corp., 774 F. Supp. 879, 882-83 (S.D.N.Y. 1991).
4 Kahn Lucas Lancaster Inc. v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 956 F. Supp. 1131 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), rev'd, 186 F.3d
210 (2nd Cir. 1999).
' See id.
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The problem in Sphere Drake, Kahn Lucas, and their progeny6 is not
necessarily their conclusions, but rather the method used to draw these
conclusions. The prime duty of a court is to find the facts and apply the
governing law(s). In interpreting the legislation, both the plain meaning and
the legislative intent should be respected. The plain meaning of the
modifiers used in Article 11 (2) is clear; the modifiers should be applied
equally to "arbitration clause in a contract" and "arbitration agreement."
Thus, Article II (2) means that an "agreement in writing" shall include.
either: (1) an arbitral clause in a contract, signed by the parties or contained
in an exchange of letters or telegrams or (2) an arbitration agreement, signed
by the parties or contained in an exchange of letters or telegrams. Although
"arbitration agreement" is closer to "signed by the parties or contained in an
exchange of letters or telegrams" in sequence, it is counter-intuitive to
construe that the latter refers exclusively to "arbitration agreement.",
7
In practice, special agreements resolving existing disputes by
arbitration are very rare; the vast majority of arbitrations are based on
arbitration clauses in contracts. The great majority of Article 11 (2) decisions
in all signatory jurisdictions involve arbitration clauses. Merchants are more
concerned with the transaction itself, not the designation of intricate dispute
resolution schemes. 8 It would be absurd if the drafters intended to leave
arbitral clauses in contracts subject to enforcement without any criteria. In
Kahn Lucas the trial court held that if contract is made according to law and
relevant conventions, the arbitration clause enclosed necessarily satisfies the
valid written form that the Convention requires. This construction not only
frustrates the drafters and signatories and puts the Convention on slippery
grounds, but it also violates the Convention's purpose, which is to encourage
the recognition and enforcement of international contracts, and to unify the
standards by which arbitration agreements are observed and arbitral awards
are enforced in the signatory countries.9
6 See Stony Brook Marine Transp. Corp. v. Wilton, 1997 A.M.C. 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1996), available at
1996 WL 913180; Borsack v. Chalk & Vermilion Fine Arts, Ltd., 974 F. Supp. 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
7 The English term "arbitration agreement" is not as accurate as its French counterpoint compromis.
A better choice is "submission agreement."
8 Some call this phenomenon "commercial irrelevance." See Jiangyu Wang, The Battle of Form for
International Commercial Contracts, 8 Civ. & COM. L. REV. 613, 545-637 (1997).
9 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
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B. Expansion of Article 11 (2) of the NYC
Fortunately, deliberate misinterpretation of the Convention, as some
U.S. courts have done, is not a common practice. Nevertheless, some courts
feel restricted when deciding cases about the form of arbitration agreements
and are inclined to try to expand the scope of Article II (2) of the
Convention. Compagnie de Navigation de Transports S.A. v. MSC
Mediterranean Shipping Company S.A. 10 is a typical Swiss case in which
only the carrier signed the bill of lading. The Swiss trial court ruled that, in
the absence of a signature by the shipper, the "agreement in writing"
requirement was not satisfied and therefore there was no enforceable
agreement to arbitrate. The Geneva appellate court overruled and found the
shipper had manifested its intent by filling in the bill of lading. The Swiss
Federal Tribunal went further in affirming the appellate court's decision,
ruling that Article 11 (2) of the NYC should be interpreted and applied in
light of the less restrictive requirements of both Article 7(2) of the
UNCITRAL Model Law and Article 178 of the Swiss Private International
Law Act. In other words, the Tribunal found a valid arbitration agreement
by applying the principles of good faith. The shipper's conduct, in particular
his filling out the form and returning it to the carrier reasonably conveyed
his assent to the contract. This decision attracted much criticism because
there is no requirement in Article II (2) that the exchange of letters or
telegrams be signed. Therefore, the writing exchanges between the parties
had satisfied the requirement of the Convention and the Swiss courts did not
have to rely on other standards.
There are deep-seated reasons for the wide range of verdicts. One
reason is the ignorance of general hierarchy of law theory. Another is
deliberate misreading of the Convention. In the background are the social
and economic drives to consummate a more uniform international
commercial arbitration law. In my view, the aberrant interpretation of
language on which there is a nearly unanimous view reveals at least two
defects of the Convention itself in addition to the respective reasons of the
"trouble-makers."
First, the New York Convention is not precise enough. Although
Article 11 (2) of the Convention sets a strict and definite requirement for the
form of arbitration agreements and makes such form a prerequisite for
recognition and enforcement of arbitration agreements, this requirement
10 Compagnie de Navigation de Transports S.A. v. MSC Mediterranean Shipping Co. S.A., ATF 121
11138 (Fed. Trib. 1995) (Switz.), reported in 3 ASS'N OF Swiss ARB. BULL. 503 (1995).
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refers only to the form, not the effectiveness of the agreement itself. For
example, the Convention does not preclude the use of other domestic
arbitration laws. Article VII (1) provides:
The provisions of the present Convention shall not ... deprive
any interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of
an arbitral award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the
law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to
be relied upon.
This statement, which simply declares coherence between the Convention
and domestic laws, leaves a loophole that is more permissive about the form
of arbitral agreements than the Convention. Thus, U.S. courts first cite the
convention and then ignore it by applying federal or state law to enforce
arbitration agreements, regardless of whether such federal law or state law is
consistent with the Convention standard."
Second, the strict written form requirement that the Convention
requires has not kept pace with current international commercial practice.
When the Convention was drafted in 1958, communication technology was
considered only to the extent of permitting letters and telegrams to satisfy
the written form requirement, and little space was left for filling the gap of
progress in technology: With recent progress in technology and commercial
activities, more and more businessmen choose to carry on their transactions
through less traditional measures that are inconsistent with the strict
meaning of Article 11 (2), such as telex, facsimile, and e-mail. Objectively
speaking, there is some logic to the following rationale found in Compagnie:
[O]ne must not however lose sight of the fact that, with the
development of modem means of communication, unsigned
writings play an increasingly significant and widespread role,
and the requirement of a significance is becoming critically less
central in particular in international commerce, and the distinct
treatment accorded signed and unsigned writings is being put
into question.
12
13 MEALEY'S INT'L ARBITRATION REPORT 31 (May 1998).
12 Compagnie, 3 ASS'N OF SWISS ARB. BULL. 510-11.
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IV. FURTHER THOUGHTS
Despite the variety of opinions, there is not much controversy over the
written form requirement for arbitration agreements. 13 However, if we do
not simply immerse ourselves in the plain words of the Convention and we
review recent judicial practice on this matter, we will find that the issue is
complex, especially with respect to how the written form requirement of
arbitration agreements is being challenged by the new commercial customs
and technologies. Both international and domestic legislation have explored
this subject since the Convention came into effect. For example, the
UNCITRAL Model Law enacted in 1985 recognized the validity of
arbitration agreements that appear by means of "telecommunications which
provide a record of the agreement, or in an exchange of statements of claim
and defense . ." In addition, Article 1021 of the 1986 Holland Arbitration
Act states that "a writing document regulating arbitration or standards of
arbitration is sufficient to constitute written form, only if this document is
accepted by the other party or the representative of the other party."
Likewise, the English Arbitration Act 1986 provides that such agreements
may be proven by a variety of means. Like it or not, the written form
requirement the Convention sets for international commercial arbitration
agreements has begun to waver. It is likely that in, the future, arbitration
agreements formed orally or tacitly will be enforced as they are in the
ordinary commercial transactions. The New York Convention does not
currently provide for such agreements, and it is not possible to prevent
courts from making broad interpretations about the form of arbitration
agreements before the Convention's definition of an enforceable arbitration
agreement is amended. Therefore, Chinese arbitration committees and
judicial organs should pay more attention to international judicial practice
when hearing or deciding arbitration cases.
13 See generally JAKIE YANG, INT'L COM. ARB. 121 (Chinese University of Political Science and
Law 1997).

